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Abstract. The predominant smart card ownership model is the issuer
centric, and it has played a vital role in the proliferation of the tech-
nology. However, recent developments of multi-application smart card
technology lead to new potential ownership models. One of the possible
models is the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model. In this model,
the ownership is with smart card users. To support user’s ownership, we
require a framework that can assist cardholders to manage applications
on their smart cards. In this paper, we present such a framework for
managing application securely on a smart card.
1 Introduction
Historically, the smart card ownership resides with organizations (card issuers)
that provide smart card based services. Smart cards issued by the card issuer
will have pre-installed applications, and they cannot customise to suit customer’s
requirements. This ownership model lacks flexibility, ubiquity and is inconvenient
to cardholders.
In last two decades, the smart card technology evolved to support multiple
applications. The adoption of multi-application smart cards was hindered by
card issuers concerns over the ownership of the card and customer relationship
along with branding issues. A possible solution to these issues is to delegate
the ownership to users. This proposal is referred to as the User Centric Smart
Card Ownership Model (UCOM), which is based on providing the complete
control over the choice of applications on a smart card, securely and efficiently,
to its cardholder. To do so, cardholders would require a secure and practical
mechanism to perform application management tasks efficiently. In this paper,
we discuss the need for the new ownership model and describe how it is different
from the existing models. The main focus of the paper is the procedures and
functions performed by a smart card and a service provider to install or delete
an application in the UCOM.
In section two, a short description of the UCOM is provided along with the
motivation for the new ownership model. Section three describes the architecture
of the Application Management Framework (AMF) that supports the applica-
tion installation and deletion process on the UCOM-based smart cards. The
application management processes (e.g. install, delete, etc) are described in sec-
tion four. Section five provides an analysis of the proposed framework. Section
six briefly looks on future research directions and finally, section seven draws the
conclusion.
2 User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
In the following sections we provide the motivation behind the User Centric
Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) proposal along with its architectural
overview.
2.1 Motivation
The multi-application smart card technology, except for the initial popularity it
never took off. However, recent developments mainly driven by the technologies
like Near Field Communication (NFC) [?] and Secure Element (SE) [2] in mobile
phones have revived again the concept of having multi-applications on a smart
card (chip).
The NFC enables a contactless data exchange between a chip (i.e. smart
card) and the terminal. It is also extended to include the mobile phones that
enable them to emulate the contactless smart cards. As a result, the existing
infrastructure deployed in the different industries (i.e. banking, transport, ac-
cess control) to support contactless smart card can be utilised. There are many
organisations around the world that are currently engaged in the field trials
[3, 4, 5], and they are fostering new business models to actively manage the
multi-applications through mobile phones.
To support the initiative, there are many different proposals to manage the
SE in the NFC based mobile phones. One proposal is to keep the traditional
ownership model so that the card issuer (i.e. Telecom) will have the ownership.
This model has traditional issues related to the ownership of smart cards and
customer relationship. Another model is to delegate the control to a third party
that does not use the SE to provide any services to end users. Such a model is
referred to as the ”Trusted Service Manager” (TSM) based model [6]. In this
model, the trust relationships with Telco operators and other service providers
are maintained by the TSMs. Eventually it enables the SE to host multiple
applications from different companies). Each company only has to establish an
individual trust relationship with a TSM.
However, the UCOM goes further by giving choice of applications on a card
to its user. The card assures a Service Provider (SP) of its underlying security
state and if satisfied the SP’s is satisfied; it can lease its application(s). The
difference between the TSM and UCOM is that TSM still requires trust rela-
tionship between service providers and a TSM that may involve business and
financial agreements. This may discourage small businesses (e.g. public library,
health centre, leisure club). In the UCOM the small companies only require to
develop their applications, and they can be installed onto their customer’s SE
in a cost effective way.
The multi-application smart cards platforms (i.e. Java [7], Multos [8]) sup-
port the installation of applications remotely (after issuance of the card). The
standardisation efforts to manage the application remotely like the GlobalPlat-
form [9] have been effective in the Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
(ICOM). In the ICOM, the control of the card is with a single organisation and
they manage the relationship with other organisations that may wish to share
the smart card. In these situations, there is always an entity (i.e. card issuer)
that has a pre-issuance secure binding with the smart card. The security mea-
sures are implemented by card issuers and they provide the security assurance.
The pre-issuance secure binding and control of security measures implemented
on smart cards provides a secure and reliable model. This notion is based on the
presumption that the ICOM is a closed environment and applications are rarely
installed and deleted from a card.
The ICOM based frameworks including the GlobalPlatform are proposed
with the assumption that the ownership will be either with a card issuer or a
third party. This assumption is not necessarily constructive when dealing with
the user’s ownership of the smart card. The ownership gives the provision to
install and delete any application that also brings new security and privacy
issues that are not present in the ICOM. The presented proposal is designed
with a basic principle that the underlying platform is open, dynamic and in the
control of its user that may act as adversary.
2.2 Overview of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model
The User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) focuses on the del-
egation of the ownership (control) to its users. The term ”Ownership” in the
UCOM does not imply that users own the application(s) installed onto their
smart card(s). It only means the freedom of choice to install or delete any ap-
plication(s). The ownership of applications will always remain with their corre-
sponding SP. The SPs will only lease their applications, after specific security,
privacy and operational requirements are satisfied by the UCOM-based smart
card. The provision to install or delete an application cannot be performed with-
out the prior authorisation of the relevant SP.
The UCOM-based smart cards should support the ownership of the card-
holder and provide adequate functionality for the application management tasks.
In addition, it should provide security assurances to SPs who lease their applica-
tions. As a crucial design requirement a UCOM-based smart card should be an
impartial, secure and robust platform. The impartiality in the UCOM refers to
providing assurance that the card does not favour any application or particular
set of applications. The following figure illustrates the architectural overview of
the UCOM.
In the UCOM, a cardholder acquires a smart card from UCSC supplier. A
smart card that supports UCOM is referred to as User Centric Smart Card
(UCSC) and a UCSC supplier can be a smart card manufacturer, an SP or a
Fig. 1. Illustration of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM)
third party vendor. After acquiring the UCSC, the cardholder can request an SP
to lease its application(s). The SP will decide the lease based on its Application
Lease Policy (ALP). If the requesting UCSC meets the ALP, the application is
leased, otherwise the request is denied. In addition to requesting the lease of an
application, the cardholder could also request the removal.
An Application Lease Policy (ALP) defines the minimum requirement of an
SP that an UCSC has to satisfy. The APL not only governs the lease of the
application(s), but also the terms of the lease. The terms of the lease stipulate
the minimum security, privacy and operational requirements of an application
while it is installed onto an UCSC. The UCSC will provide adequate measures
to enable an application to verify the execution environment before executing.
Furthermore, the lease of an application can be temporary (time/execution con-
straint) as defined by the ALP. The UCSC or the application will initiate the
deletion command once it reaches the expiry. After application(s) is leased, the
cardholder can request the SP’s associated services that are entitled to the card-
holder (application) via a service point. A service point is a point of service
device (i.e. ATM, Access Controllers) where a user presents his/her smart card
to utilise certain services. The basic function of a service point is to connect an
application to the relevant SP, so the application can authenticate itself before
the user is being facilitated by the service point in accessing the SP’s services.
SPs will make their application for installation ubiquitously accessible to
their customers by offering them through a web server, referred as an Application
Management Server (AMS). In addition to the AMS, SPs also have an Applica-
tion Services Authentication Server (ASAS). These two servers are essential to
support the UCOM from SPs perspective. SPs will provide their customers with
the AMS credentials (i.e. AMS web address) and user’s credentials (i.e. Account
ID, login/password) that they can use to access and authenticate to the AMS.
An AMS typically deals with the application management processes (i.e. in-
stallation, deletion). The application management processes also include enforc-
ing the ALP, ensuring that the application is transmitted and installed securely
Fig. 2. Illustration of Application Management Framework
onto a smart card, and managing a user’s profile. The user’s profile keeps record
of the registered smart cards and card(s) that hold the active lease. Depending
upon an SP’s ALP, a user can have the application installed onto multiple cards;
therefore, the AMS keeps track of all cards of a particular user that hold/held
the lease.
3 Application Management Framework
An overview of the framework is provided in section 3.1. Section 3.2 explains the
basic UCSC configuration required to support the framework. The establishment
of a secure connection between an UCSC and an SP’s AMS is described in section
3.3.
3.1 Application Management Framework Overview
The UCOM Application Management framework (AMF) that stipulates the
mechanism of application installation and deletion is illustrated in Figure 2. To
initiate the AMF processes a cardholder presents his/her UCSC to a host device.
A host device (i.e. cell phones, kiosks, and computers) acts as the connection
bridge between the smart card (i.e. UCSC) and the AMS. The cardholder will
provide his/her account credentials for an AMS to the Card Application Man-
agement Software (CAMS). The basic functionality of the CAMS is to provide
an interface (between a cardholder, UCSC and AMS) and protocol conversion
(if required). The protocol conversion addresses any incompatibilities between a
smart card and an AMS supported protocols. For example, a smart card may
not support TCP/IP protocol so protocol conversion will provide the TCP/IP
support. After a cardholder’s authentication with an AMS, a secure channel is
established (section 3.3) between the UCSC and AMS. The next phase involves
the initiation of the required tasks (i.e. installation, deletion, etc) that are dis-
cussed in section 4.
3.2 Basic User Centric Smart Card Configuration
The basic design principle of the UCOM is to be independent of underlying
Smart Card Operating System (SCOS) [10] or platform. However, for practical
and security reasons we have to define the minimum requirements for differ-
ent components of the UCOM. The minimum requirement that a UCSC should
satisfy for the AMF is to have an SSL/TLS public key pair and public key
certificate [11]. A UCSC will have a SSL/TLS public key pair and certificate,
irrespectively of the underlying protocol (i.e. TCP/IP [12] and SSL/TLS [11])
handling. If an UCSC supports a web server [16] along with the TCP/IP and
SSL/TLS protocols, the secure communication channel would be established en-
tirely by the UCSC, otherwise the CAMS should provide the protocol conversion
functionality. In any situation, all cryptographic functions are only handled by
the UCSC.
The AMF uses both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography [13] to provide
security and privacy services. The cryptographic keys used beside the SSL/TLS
keys are generated by the AMSs and smart cards. These keys are lease spe-
cific and when the lease expires or the cardholder requests the deletion of the
application, all cryptographic keys associated with the application will also be
deleted. The UCSC supports the domain mechanism for post-installation ap-
plication lifecycle management as in the GlobalPlatform (GP) [9]. The subtle
difference between the GP and UCOM domain mechanism is the non-availability
of Issuer’s Domain. In addition, no entity (i.e. card manufacturer, SP and card-
holder) has ownership of the security domain of the UCSC. The reason for not
giving the control of the security domain is to avoid the possibility of indirect
control of the UCSC and also to ensure SPs that there will not be any over-riding
privileges for an entity.
The UCSCs will have adequate mechanisms to ensure SPs that they satisfy
their ALP. One of the integral parts of the ALP requirement verification is the
validation of the security of an UCSC. The existing security validation is based
on initiating the security evaluation of the smart card according to the Com-
mon Criteria (CC) [14]. At the end of the Common Criteria Evaluation, the
smart card is given the Common Criteria Security Evaluation Assurance Level
(EAL). The EAL determines how thoroughly the evaluation is performed and
the security of the underlying hardware and software. In the ICOM environ-
ment, the EAL is not present on the smart card and it is a certificate that is
mostly kept off-card by the organisation (card issuers). However, in the UCOM
the Common Criteria Security EAL can play an important role to certify the
level of security assurance that an UCSC provides. This can be done by the
on-card Common Criteria Security Evaluation Certificate (CC-Certificate). The
certificate is cryptographically protected in order to provide the EAL of the
platform. As the certificate can only provide assurance of the state of the se-
curity at the time of evaluation and the card manufacture may opt to deploy
weaker security. To avoid this, the certificate also contains an image (created by
cryptographic hash function [13]) of the underlying hardware and software. The
smart card itself or an SP’s application can request the self-test of the card to
gain the assurance of the security. The self-test basically generates the image
of the underlying software (Smart Card Operating System) and optional hard-
ware configurations. This image is then verified with the image associated with
CC-Certificate. If both match, it can be safe to assume that the platform is at
similar state as it was when the CC evaluation was carried out. To perform the
image measurement and then comparison, the possible solution can be a Trusted
Platform Module (TPM) [15] for the smart card. The scope of exact solution to
provide the assurance for the security of an UCSC and how different components
will interact with each other is beyond the scope of this paper.
3.3 Secure Channel Establishment between an UCSC and an AMS
A cardholder will initiate the connection with an AMS through the CAMS inter-
face. The user provides the AMS details (e.g. web address) to the CAMS. that
initiates a connection. The AMS establishes a secure connection (i.e. SSL/TLS
[12]) with the requesting CAMS. After establishing the connection, the AMS re-
quests the user’s credentials. The user provides his/her credentials (i.e. account
ID, login/password) through the CAMS interface. The details and type of the
credentials are on the SP’s sole discretion. The AMS verifies the credentials, if
it is successful, it will allow the access to its services, and otherwise the connec-
tion is terminated. After the authentication the two-way SSL/TLS [12] session is
established between the smart card and the AMS. There are well tested and se-
cure protocols already in the public domain; therefore, this paper does not focus
on designing a new protocol. However, the secure channel protocol established
between the smart card and the AMS should be based on Public Key cryptosys-
tem (e.g. SSL/TLS). After a secure channel protocol between a smart card and
an AMS is established then cardholders can request application installation or
deletion, which will be discussed in the next section.
4 Application Management Processes
In this section the crucial process of installation of an application is described
in section 4.1.
4.1 Installation Process
In this section, the processes that support the secure transmission and installa-
tion of an application are discussed. In the ICOM based environment, there are
many secure and robust application delivery mechanisms, most notably by the
GlobalPlatform.
Most of these mechanisms rely on the assumption that the smart card is in
a closed environment and under the total control of the card issuer. The card
issuer has a secure binding with their smart cards before they are issued to
their customers. Therefore, there is an implicit trust on the smart card in the
ICOM, and most of the protocols are based on it. However in the UCOM, there
is no implicit trust on the smart card. Therefore, the installation process has
not only to take this into account but also that the smart card can be under
the control of a malicious user, or it may not be a real smart card (card emula-
tor running on a personal computer). The installation process discussed in this
section builds the additional checks around the existing application installation
protocols (without preferring anyone) that can provide the assurance of secure
and reliable application installation.
The installation request will initiate the process of acquiring an application
from an AMS and install it on a UCSC. The entire process can be divided into
six sub processes listed below.
1. Requirement Verification
2. Domain Creation
3. Downloading
4. Application Verification by card
5. Localisation (Installation)
6. Personalisation
7. Application Registration by AMS
Each of these sub-processes is explained in sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.7. The ap-
plication deletion process is similar but the steps will be performed in reverse
order.
4.1.1 Requirement Verification. Before the lease of an application, the
AMS will verify the compliance of an UCSC with its ALP. This verification is
illustrated by the flowchart shown in figure 3.
A UCSC creates the Application Request message that contains the UCSC
details. The details include the CC-Certificate, UCSC manufacturer certificate,
details of the SCOS/runtime environment (i.e. Java Card [7], Multos [8], etc),
supported cryptographic algorithms, and communication interfaces (e.g. T1, T2
or CL [10], web [16]]). The manufacturer certificate validates the cryptographic
public keys pair and hardware tag. The hardware tag is unique sequence that
identifies the UCSC. The length of the tag and how it is generated is on the sole
discretion of the UCSC manufacturer. Requirements on the hardware tag by the
UCOM are that it does not violate the privacy of the cardholder and actively
verifies that the AMS is communicating with the real card (not an emulator).
The AMS will verify whether the requesting UCSC satisfies the ALP. If so, it
continues, otherwise process terminates. To verify the CC-Certificate and UCSC
manufacturer certificate, the AMS can communicate with either the entity that
has issued these certificates, or a third party that plays the role of intermediary
between the AMS and the UCSC manufacturers. To validate that the AMS is
communicating with a real smart card (not an emulator), the AMS can request
the UCSC manufacturer to verify the claim of their card. The details of these
processes are beyond the scope of the paper.
After validation of the ALP, the AMS generates application requirement
details. This contains the application space and on-card security policy require-
ments. Application space requirement stipulates the memory required for the
Fig. 3. Illustration of Requirement Verification Phase
application and the on-card security policy requirement includes the required
firewall and application access configuration. The firewall configuration defines
the mechanism through which an on-card application(s) can access (share) the
requested application. The application access configuration details the mech-
anism through which an off-card application communicates with the applica-
tion. In addition, the AMS specifies the generation requirement for the domain
management key, application download key and algorithm used to encrypt the
application for transmission.
The AMS and UCSC can negotiate the application communication proto-
col. The AMS can decide whether to use any of the UCSC implemented (open)
protocols. Once the trust relationship is established and domain keys are gen-
erated, any protocols (including the GlobalPlatform) can be used to download
the application on to the smart card. The AMS can also opt for their propri-
etary protocol to download the application. This can be achieved by first using
the UCSC supported protocols to download a proprietary (small) application
referred to as Application Download Manager (ADM), to a least privilege do-
main; the ADM will manage the download of the request application. The lease
privilege domain is controlled by the UCSC, and it is a temporary domain. Appli-
cations installed in this domain are not allowed to communicate with any other
applications on the smart card, which means they are in an isolated domain.
The security measures will ensure that the ADM will abide by the policy of the
UCSC. Before the ADM starts the execution, it will be subjected to security
tests on the card to achieve the assurance that the download manager is secure
and reliable to execute. During the download process, if the ADM performs any
unauthorised action, the UCSC will terminate its execution and deleted it. After
the application is successfully downloaded, the ADM will be deleted.
The smart card will examine the application requirement sent by the AMS.
If it meets these requirements, it will send an acknowledgement to AMS and
proceed to the domain creation process; otherwise, it will terminate the process.
4.1.2 Domain Creation. After the AMS and UCSC have verified each other’s
requirements, the next phase is to create a domain (SP’s Domain), involving the
following steps:
1. Allocate memory space for the SP’s Domain in the EEPROM [10] (Electri-
cally Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory).
2. After the allocation of memory space, a domain manager is installed in the
allocated memory. A domain manager maintains the security aspects of the
domain. Its functions are similar to a security domain in the GlobalPlatform
[9]. An SP will have a view of their domain as a complete smart card.
3. After a domain is created, the Domain Delegation keys are generated. These
keys can be generated in one of the following ways:
– Either an UCSC or an AMS will generate the key and exchange it.
– Alternatively, an UCSC and AMS can mutually generate them.
Which of the above methods is going to be used is negotiated in the require-
ment verification process (i.e. section 4.1.1). Any requirements regarding the
generation of the keys is solely based on SP’s discretion and UCSC will follow
these guidelines.
4.1.3 Downloading. After generation and mutual authentication of the Do-
main Delegation keys, the AMS and UCSC will start the application down-
loading process, shown in figure 4. An AMS will prepare the application(s) for
transmitting it to the requesting UCSC. The application consists of multiple
modules with varying security and operational requirements. The grouping of
the application into modules of varying security and operational requirements is
referred to as Application Level Modularity (ALM). Each application (i.e. bank-
ing, telecom, transport) can be divided into small modules with vary security
requirement. Each application have some operational and security program code
and data. These modules simply represent these logical divisions but on the line
of sensitivity to the service provider. The exact framework and implementation
guidelines of ALM are beyond the scope of this paper. However, for the applica-
tion download process, each of the modules (i.e. group, level) of an application
is encrypted with different key, and these keys are only revealed to the UCSC
in incremental fashion after it satisfied the module’s security and operational
requirements.
The AMS will digitally sign the application with the corresponding SP’s
signature key, then encrypt with the transmission key. The transmission key is
generated during the step three of section 4.1.2. After this the application it is
transmitted to the UCSC.
The Application Download Handler (ADH) module in the UCSC handles
the incoming packets. The ADH supports different application download pro-
tocols (implemented by card manufacturer). The AMS either selects one of the
supported protocols or opts for its own protocol. If the SP’s opt for its own
protocol then the ADM (section 4.1.1) handle the application download process.
The function of the ADH is to efficiently download the application in a secure
and reliable fashion. The received packages of the application are not installed,
because they first require the application signature validation and decryption.
Therefore, downloaded applications are stored in a temporary space (in either
EEPROM or RAM [10]).
Fig. 4. Downloading an Application on an UCSC
After the download is completed, the digital signature of the encrypted ap-
plication is verified. After verification of the digital signature the application is
transferred to the SP’s Domain and the application is decrypted there. A de-
crypted application is not a fully installed application. It is the equivalent of
copying an application in a memory location. The decrypted application cannot
be executed unless it satisfies the application verification test, discussed in the
next section.
4.1.4 Application Verification by Smart Card. After an application is
downloaded into the SP’s domain, the next step is to verify whether the ap-
plication complies with operational and security policy of the UCSC or not.
A UCSC’s operational and security policy defines the sanctioned operations,
privileges and runtime environment restrictions on the SP’s domain. To verify
whether an application code conforms to specification and standards (i.e. Java
Card [7], Multos [8], etc), a byte code verification is performed [17].
The byte code verification will take place on the smart card for security
reasons. Performing byte code verification on the CAMS will be much faster,
because in most cases it would be hosted on computationally faster machines.
However, this violates the security requirement of the SP, because for a CAMS
to perform byte code verification, the decrypted application would have to be
transferred out of the UCSC.
The scope of this paper is not to define a byte code verifier; however, there
are several well defined on-card byte code verification proposals [18, 19, 20].
4.1.5 Localisation. The application is allowed to execute on the UCSC only
after it is properly verified by the UCSC. On its first execution, the application
registers its security policy details with the card’s security services (i.e. firewall,
access manager, SP’s domain manager, cryptographic services etc.). Further-
more, it may require access to specific logical or physical (i.e. contact, contactless
or web server) channels. The application will register with the communication
handler (service that handles communications in and out of an UCSC) and the
UCSC’s application manager that allows application to be selected by an off-
card entity’s. Once the registration is complete, is the application is considered
installed and could be accessed by an off-card entity.
4.1.6 Personalisation. After localisation is completed, the SP’s application
will initiate the personalisation process. The personalisation data (i.e. user’s
specific data) is downloaded with the application; however, it is separately en-
crypted. The process is as listed below.
1. An SP’s application creates a message that contains on-card test and local-
isation process response. In addition, it generates a message for application
personalisation request.
2. The AMS verifies the on-card test and localisation message. If verified it will
generate the message containing the cryptographic key and digital signature
on the encrypted personalisation data and it sent to the smart card. On
failure the AMS will terminate the process and the smart card will delete
the application.
3. The UCSC decrypts the personalisation data and verifies the digital signa-
ture. If the verification fails then the UCSC request the download again.
However, if the signature verification fails after multiple tries (depending
upon the UCSC’s policy) then the process is terminated and the application
is deleted.
4. An acknowledgement message is generated to verify to the AMS that the
application is personalised successfully.
5. The AMS verify the acknowledgment message and initiate the next phase
(i.e. application registration).
4.1.7 Application Registration by an AMS. The final stage of an appli-
cation installation on an UCSC is the application registration by the AMS. In
this stage, the AMS will register the UCSC as authorised card to an Applica-
tion Lease Database (ALD) hosted on the Application Services Access Server
(ASAS). After the completion of this process, the UCSC will be ready to access
the SP’s services.
In the UCOM, applications can be installed on one or more cards. Actually,
the SP will decide whether they will allow the user to keep their application on
multiple cards or not (i.e. Application Lease Policy). For certain applications,
being on multiple cards would not be an issue like banking application (as it
requires PIN to use the card. Therefore, if a person provides the correct PIN
and it posses the appropriate application in his UCSC that means the owner
was present at the point of transaction).
Fig. 5. Secure Communication Channel between an AMS and a Smart Card
5 Critique of the Framework
In this section, we will critically analyse the Application Management Framework
in terms of its feasibility, practically and overall security perspective.
5.1 Security Analysis of the Framework
The most crucial and sensitive operation in the Application Management Frame-
work is the application installation process. In this process, the application is
transmitted over an insecure network from an AMS to a User Centric Smart
Card (UCSC). The figure 5 illustrates the security envelopes on the application
in transit over an insecure network.
The top envelope is provided by the two-way SSL/TLS session established
directly between an UCSC and an AMS. During the second phase (i.e. Domain
Creation) of the installation process, the Domain Delegation keys are generated.
Along with these keys the Application Installation key (i.e. transmission keys)
are also generated that are used by the Application Download Handler (ADH)
to securely download the application from its respective SP. The Application
Installation keys are only used once, at the time of installation and then they
are securely discarded. During the deletion process, an SP only needs to use their
Domain Delegation keys to instruct the deletion command to their application.
The final layer of protection in the application installation process is provided by
Application Level Modularity (ALM). In ALM each group of modules with the
same security association and requirements would be encrypted separately with
different keys, and each of the keys are only provided to an UCSC after it satisfies
the associated requirements for the module level. Therefore, an application has at
least three security layers for the secure communication on the insecure network
during the installation process, as shown in the figure 5. An obvious attack can
be to reset an UCSC with weak security provisions (i.e. SSL/TLS key pair,
domain key generation mechanism etc). However, an SP will always have the
right to deny any UCSC that cannot satisfy its requirements. Therefore, the SP
has to be sure of security measures implemented by the UCSC before it leases
its application. This assurance is provided by the Common Criteria Security
Evaluation Certificate, UCSC manufacturer certificate and self testing or state
assurance mechanism (i.e. Trusted Platform Module in SE).
In addition, attacks like fault attacks or Side-channel attacks [21] on a smart
card can be mounted against an UCSC. As a protection measure against the fault
attacks during the installation/deletion process (either to corrupt the UCSC or
the application to retrieve sensitive data), the UCSC will be in defensive mode.
The defensive mode enables an UCSC to save the secure, operational and reliable
state of the UCSC before proceeding with the installation process. In addition,
the UCSC intercepts each instruction and determines whether the execution of
the instruction will violate the safe state of the UCSC or not. If it is safe to ex-
ecute, it will allow the instruction to be carried out; otherwise, it will terminate
the process. If anything goes wrong, the UCSC aborts the installation process
and reset to the safe state (saved before the process initiated. The safe state of
the smart card represents the state of the operational, and security modules (i.e.
Firewall, Access Controller, Communication Channels, Execution Environment)
of the UCSC that are responsible for the smart card platform reliability and
security. The defence against the side channel attacks is mostly implemented
on the hardware layer. Therefore, Common Criteria Security Evaluation Cer-
tificate will test the security mechanisms that provide protection against the
Side-Channel attacks. If a service provider does not accept the certificate, the
process will be terminated. The SPs are in total control of their applications
and they have the sole discretion whether to lease or deny the lease request, this
assures the service providers that their application will only be installed on an
UCSC that meets their ALP, after their authorisation.
5.2 Operational Critique of Framework
The User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) emphasise on dele-
gating the ownership of the smart card to its user. Therefore, the framework
that supports the UCOM proposal has to be user friendly and less complex.
The application installation, especially on the smart card, is technically chal-
lenging. Therefore, the proposed Application Management Framework (AMF)
performs majority of the processes without the cardholder’s interaction. It will
be less prone to errors if the user interaction during the application management
processes is limited.
As a result of the recent technological developments in mobile handsets (i.e.
Near Field Communication), there is a renewed interest by large scale horizontal
industries (i.e. banks, transport and telecom operators) in the multi-application
smart card initiative. The UCOM capitalises on the development and gives the
opportunity to small organisation to develop applications that can be deployed
on their user’s UCOM supported NFC enabled mobile phones. The framework
proposed in the paper does not rely heavily on telecom operators. The basic re-
quirement is to establish an internet connection with the service provider’s Ap-
plication Management Server (AMS). This can be achieved through connecting
to the internet by wireless internet, Bluetooth or cable connection (by connect-
ing the mobile phone with a personal computer). The overall framework would
not require any change to cope with different intermediary networks (protocols)
that establish a connection with the service provider’s AMS. In certain situations
(i.e. small organisations, home environment), there is no need to set up AMS
and connect the UCOM-based smart card through internet. In such cases the
user can actually install the application, by directly connecting with the AMS
without an internet. The only change to the framework is on the Card Appli-
cation Management Software (CAMS) that has to connect to a local computer
through any of the supported bearers (i.e. Bluetooth, wireless, USB). This makes
the UCOM capable of being deployed in local environments that are difficult to
achieve in the SE management framework that relies on Trusted Service Manager
(TSM). Possible applications in the local environments can be access controller
(i.e. doors, car, computers), home appliance management application (controls
the intelligent kitchen, home appliances), utility meters payment/management,
local library, school/college and local grocery stores application etc.
6 Future Research Directions
This paper should not be considered as one that has solved all of the issues
relating to the UCOM or the AMF. The issues that are still not resolved are
listed in this section.
– Common Criteria Security Evaluation Certificate: The Common Criteria do
not stipulate a security certificate on the smart card itself. The certificate
discussed in the paper provides an assurance of security from the neutral
security evaluators. SPs can rely on their evaluations to verify the security
claim of the UCSC. Further research is required in the security evaluation
certificate mechanism and how they can be integrated with other components
(i.e. TPM) on an UCSC to provide security assurance to SPs.
– Firewall: Firewall designs of modern smart cards are based on the presump-
tion that the smart card is under complete control of the card issuer. Due
to this assumption, the firewall is designed from the point of view of what
can be shared. Therefore, traditional firewall mechanism in the smart cards
may not be adequate for the UCOM.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, a framework is presented for application management in the User
Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM). The operations preformed by
the smart card and Application Managment Server (AMS) are provided and such
operations are possible with the present state of the technology as most of these
measures are already implemented to support other mechanisms. In addition this
paper also provides the associated issues that are required to be resolved to fully
explore the user’s ownership model. Further work will be conducted in order to
attempt to answer the pointes mentioned in the future research directions.
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